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Void marriages, maintenance, and matrimonial assets 
 
CHEN SIYUAN* 
NICHOLAS POON**  
 
ADP v ADQ [2012] SGCA 6 
 
Do Singapore courts have jurisdiction under the Women’s Charter1 to order maintenance 
and the division of matrimonial assets when a marriage has been declared void? This was the 
novel issue presented in ADP v ADQ,2  and the Court of Appeal answered in the affirmative. 
 
The context 
The relevant facts can be briefly stated. A had married R in Hong Kong. However, this 
marriage was contracted before A’s first marriage in Japan to someone else had terminated. 
This meant that the Hong Kong marriage was void on the ground of bigamy, although 
knowledge of this only emerged much later on. After the Singapore Family Court declared 
the Hong Kong marriage void, both the District Court and High Court held that they 
possessed no power to order maintenance and the division of matrimonial assets.  
Central to the issue was the interpretation of two key provisions in the Women’s Charter. 
First, s 112(1) states that the court shall have the power, when granting or subsequent to 
granting a “nullity of marriage”, to order the division of matrimonial assets “in such 
proportions as the court thinks just and equitable.” Second, s 113 states that the court may 
order a man to pay maintenance to his “wife or former wife” during the course of “any 
matrimonial proceedings” or when granting or subsequent to granting a “nullity of 
marriage”. 
The grounds of the decision 
Whereas the High Court drew various distinctions between void and voidable marriages that 
eventually led it to decide that the court may have the power to order maintenance and the 
division of matrimonial assets for voidable but not void marriages,3 the Court of Appeal took 
a different approach. Citing the legislative and historical background of ss 112 and 113, 
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academic opinion, and general policy and principle, the Court of Appeal relied on the 
following points in coming to its decision: 
(1) A purposive approach ought to be taken in statutory construction; however, if 
the meaning of the statutory language is plain and clear, the court must give 
effect to that meaning.4 
(2) Part X Chapter III (titled “Nullity of Marriage”) of the Women’s Charter contains 
provisions relating to both void and voidable marriages.5 
(3) Sections 112 and 113 do not refer to voidable marriages only.6 
(4) Divorces and petitions for nullity both result in the disintegration of the family 
unit. Ancillary relief thus ought to be available even in the latter situation.7 
(5) No cases have said that the court’s exercise of ancillary powers should be 
attenuated where a marriage is void.8 
(6) A void marriage is different from a “non-marriage”; the latter refers to a 
situation where the parties have no marital relationship whatsoever. In contrast, 
parties to a void marriage may have conducted themselves as if the marriage was 
valid.9 
(7) Select Committee proceedings vis-à-vis predecessor provisions to ss 112 and 113 
reveal that Parliament clearly intended the courts to have the discretion to order 
maintenance and the division of matrimonial assets even in void marriages.10 
(8) Historically, the concept of nullity of marriage arose to mitigate the hardships 
engendered by the indissolubility of marriage, while the distinction between void 
and voidable marriages arose from a historical tussle that is no longer relevant 
today. Although void and voidable marriages are distinguishable in terms of 
legal consequences (especially where third parties are concerned), this does not 
affect the question of ancillary relief.11 
(9) The well-established broad brush approach with regard to the division of 
matrimonial assets is consistent with a court having the power to award a 
portion of the assets to a spouse even in a void marriage if it is just and equitable 
in the circumstances.12 
(10) It would neither have been more just nor more efficient for the spouse in a void 
marriage to resort to the general law instead for her financial claims.13 
 
                                                           
4 ADP v ADQ [2012] SGCA 6 at [29]. 
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Some comments on the decision 
Insofar as the issue of whether “nullity of marriage” (as found in ss 112 and 113) comprises 
both void and voidable marriages is concerned, the Court of Appeal’s decision when 
examined as a whole is comprehensive, and legally and logically sound. However, two points 
are raised here for future consideration.  
The first point to be raised is that with regard to the distinction drawn between void 
marriages and non-marriages, although the Court of Appeal identified the sole criterion of “a 
mutual intention to marry” as the distinguishing factor between the two types of marriages 
and it referred to this criterion as a fundamental contractual requirement of all marriages, 
using the lens of pure contractual analysis may not be entirely satisfactory. Indeed, the court 
acknowledged the “conceptual difficulties” that arise from the proposition that parties can 
derive rights from a marriage found void ab initio – since a contract that is void ab initio 
means it never existed and accordingly no rights and obligations attach to such a contract – 
and did not seem entirely comfortable endorsing a separate category of void contracts (in the 
form of non-marriages) whereby no such rights can be derived.14 The unarticulated 
exacerbation of this tension lies in the fact that much more often than not, spouses do 
receive some maintenance and some portion of the pool of matrimonial assets to be divided, 
and there is no indication from the Court of Appeal that this will be any different for void 
marriages (but not non-marriages) as a matter of principle.    
Perhaps a way to preserve (and indeed, not upend) the contractual notion of void ab initio 
while at the same time recognising that there are legal consequences to a void marriage, as 
opposed to a non-marriage, would be to recognise that there are other legal consequences 
that flow from a void marriage that do not arise out of the marriage per se. The key is to 
divorce the notion that the legal consequences that flow from a void marriage on which 
ancillary relief is based are derived from the voided marriage; by way of analogy, the fact that 
a contract is void ab initio does not ipso jure mean that there are no legal consequences 
flowing from the relationship between the parties to the voided contract. Indeed, where 
monies have passed pursuant to a voided contract, the party who had paid the monies under 
the voided contract has a legitimate claim against the party to whom the monies was paid. 
This claim in unjust enrichment is not dependent or derived from the voided contract – since 
no claim can be founded on the voided contract – but nevertheless arises out of the 
relationship between the parties to the voided contract.  
Likewise, the fact that a marriage is void does not mean that there can be no legal 
consequences arising out of the marriage. It is thus plausible to recognise that a void 
marriage does not preclude an assertion of rights and remedies between the parties to the 
void marriage; this assertion of rights and remedies in turn founds the justification for 
ancillary relief being afforded to parties in certain void marriages.15 From this perspective, 
parties to a void marriage are given rights arising from the marriage not because the 
marriage was at some point valid and subsisting, but because they were putative spouses to a 
putative marriage.16 In this regard, the High Court’s concern with the wording in s 113 of the 
Women’s Charter, namely the references to only “wife” and “former wife” (with no reference 
to “non-wife” or something to that effect),17 is also assuaged. It is submitted that a “wife” to a 
void marriage can qualify for maintenance under s 113 on the ground that a “former wife” 
should be read broadly to include “a putative wife”.  
                                                           
14 ADP v ADQ [2012] SGCA 6 at [41]. 
15 In the French legal system, it appears that the basis for giving spouses to a marriage void ab initio legal rights is 
the doctrine of good faith: see David Fine, “The Rights of Putative Spouses: Choice of Law Issues and 
Comparative Insights” (1983) 32(3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 708 at 708–710. 
16 David Fine, “The Rights of Putative Spouses: Choice of Law Issues and Comparative Insights” (1983) 32(3) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 708 at 709. 
17 ADP v ADQ [2011] 3 SLR 370 at [16]. 
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The second point to be raised is that the Court of Appeal could have taken the opportunity to 
provide guidance on what other factors the court should take into account in dividing 
matrimonial assets or calculating the quantum and duration of maintenance in what is 
essentially a sui generis context (viz, rights arising from void marriages which are not non-
marriages). Absent such guidance, the logical presumption is that all the relevant factors are 
already covered by the Women’s Charter; indeed, the Court of Appeal only committed itself 
to the rather tentative (and brief) position that there is “sufficient flexibility within the broad 
brush approach… such as to make it just and equitable that a particular spouse be given a 
low or (in extreme circumstances such as where the marriage is an exceedingly short one) 
little or no proportion of the matrimonial assets.”18 This is where it is apposite to revisit the 
trial judgment. Although the trial judge may have made the mistaken conclusion (that 
“nullity of marriage” only refers to voidable but not void marriages), there is possibly some 
force behind the motivation on which the conclusion was made. The relevant passage from 
the trial judgment is as follows:  
There are strong reasons which suggest that [the issue of ancillary relief arising out of 
void marriages] is not best resolved on a “yes” or “no” basis. A marriage can be 
rendered void for different reasons. Even if we restrict ourselves to the present case 
where a marriage that is void because one party is already married when the marriage 
is contracted, a party’s knowledge and culpability may vary … an innocent party may 
be accorded rights and liabilities as though the marriage was legal, and a “guilty” 
party may be denied of any rights, and be subject to the liabilities. Needless to say, 
there will be many variations to the facts which require the different treatments, 
and legal, sociological and public policy considerations will have to be taken into 
account. 
It is not appropriate for a court to extrapolate an answer as these matters should be 
addressed by the legislature ... Against the backdrop that a void marriage is not a 
marriage, the parties were not in a state of matrimony and there can be no 
matrimonial assets to be divided …  
Similarly, when s 113 states that a court may order a man to pay maintenance to his 
wife or former wife, that is predicated on the claimant being one or the other. In the 
case of a void marriage, the claimant is neither. Even if we assume that the court can 
overlook that as a technicality, there is no one correct solution. A “wife” who is 
unaware of the impediment would have a moral claim for maintenance, but a “wife” 
who suppressed the impediment so as to deceive the other party and the marriage 
authorities would have a weak claim.19 
In other words, the trial judge did not think that a court is the proper province to determine 
issues of maintenance and division of matrimonial assets in the context of void marriages, 
because there will be too many moral variations to the facts that shape and determine the 
strength of any such claim to ancillary relief. In the trial judge’s opinion, such complex 
considerations can only be properly addressed by the legislature. Notably, the judicial 
aversion to such (perceived) open-ended moral inquiries finds similar expression in the 
context of a rejected variant of void marriages, viz, sham marriages. In Toh Seok Kheng v 
Huang Huiqun for instance,20 the High Court maintained that no special moral status is 
accorded to marriages and that in any event, “the tension between the contractual and 
institutional perspectives of marriage upon which the concept of a sham marriage rests 
cannot be resolved by the courts.”21 Here, on the one hand, the Court of Appeal (in ADP v 
ADQ) is saying that the court is entirely well-placed to deal with the moral variations to the 
                                                           
18 ADP v ADQ [2012] SGCA 6 at [65]. 
19 ADP v ADQ [2011] 3 SLR 370 at [14]–[16] (emphasis added). 
20 [2011] 1 SLR 737. See also Tan Ah Thee v Lim Soo Foong [2009] 3 SLR(R) 957. 
21 Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun [2011] 1 SLR 737 at [11] (emphasis added). 
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facts when answering questions of maintenance and division of matrimonial assets even 
after a marriage has been found void, without seeing the need to explicate how this can be 
done.22 On the other hand, the High Court (in ADP v ADQ) is effectively saying that the 
Women’s Charter does not offer sufficient guidance in such a situation; analogously, cases 
such as Toh Seok Kheng v Huang Huiqun suggest that a court should not venture into 
uncharted moral territory unless the Women’s Charter provides for it.23 While the broad 
brush approach may provide satisfactory answers to the majority of cases, there will 
inevitably be that small category of cases where one spouse is so much more blameworthy 
than the other. The question thus is in such situations, is the court ready to impute 
considerations of morality into the flexible, broad brush, overarching principle of “just and 
equitable”? The answer can cut both ways and the more important point is that the law 
should reduce uncertainty, not contribute to it.  
Obviously, as in any other area of law, the best solution is legislative reform that injects 
clarity. If the status quo remains, it seems that the only way to reconcile the basic philosophy 
underlying the local family law jurisprudence is to say that the court is only prepared to go as 
far as what parliament has clearly mandated via legislation (the Women’s Charter in this 
case). Perhaps that was the constraint which straitjacketed the Court of Appeal. The plain 
and ordinary wording of ss 112 and 113 of the Women’s Charter, together with the 
parliamentary preparatory materials, clearly supports – even mandates – the Court of 
Appeal’s conclusion that ancillary relief for both void (excluding non-marriages) and 
voidable marriages was envisaged under Part X of the Women’s Charter. Therein lies the 
problem: Parliament has prescribed what is strictly a legal absurdity without explaining how 
the courts can circumvent this absurdity. In these circumstances, the most feasible option 
may simply be to state the law in as broad terms as practicable, which was precisely what the 
Court of Appeal did. 
                                                           
22 Put another way, the Women’s Charter either provides sufficient guidance or endows a broad enough 
discretionary mandate on the court. 
23 The court held at [12] that the court cannot declare a marriage void on grounds other than those in the 
Women’s Charter; accordingly, the court cannot declare a sham marriage void. But see cases in which the court 
has not refrained from preventing parties from forming an agreement to resile from a marriage: eg, Kwong Sin 
Hwa v Lau Lee Yen [1993] 1 SLR(R) 90 at [38]. 
